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Abstract. We explain the raison d’eˆtre and basic ideas of input/output
logic, sketching the central elements with pointers to other publications
for detailed developments. The motivation comes from the logic of norms.
Unconstrained input/output operations are straightforward to define,
with relatively simple behaviour, but ignore the subtleties of contrary-
to-duty norms. To deal with these more sensitively, we constrain in-
put/output operations by means of consistency conditions, expressed via
the concept of an outfamily. They also provide a convenient platform for
distinguishing and analysing several different kinds of permission.
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1 Motivation
Input/output logic takes its origin in the study of conditional norms. These may
express desired features of a situation, obligations under some legal, moral or
practical code, goals, contingency plans, advice, etc. Typically they may be ex-
pressed in terms like: In such-and-such a situation, so-and-so should be the case,
or . . . should be brought about, or . . . should be worked towards, or . . . should be
followed – these locutions corresponding roughly to the kinds of norm mentioned.
To be more accurate, input/output logic has its source in a tension between
the philosophy of norms and formal work of deontic logicians.
Philosophically, it is widely accepted that a distinction may be drawn between
norms on the one hand, and declarative statements on the other. Declarative
statements may bear truth-values, in other words are capable of being true or
false; but norms are items of another kind. They may be respected (or not), and
may also be assessed from the standpoint of other norms, for example when a
legal norm is judged from a moral point of view (or vice versa). But it makes no
sense to describe norms as true or as false.
However the formal work of deontic logicians often goes on as if such a distinc-
tion had never been heard of. The usual presentations of deontic logic, whether
? This paper extends [11] with Section 6 on permissions.
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axiomatic or semantic, treat norms as if they could bear truth-values. In par-
ticular, the truth-functional connectives and, or and most spectacularly not are
routinely applied to norms, forming compound norms out of elementary ones.
Semantic constructions using possible worlds go further by offering rules to de-
termine, in a model, the truth-value of a norm.
This anomaly was noticed more than half a century ago, by Dubislav [4]
and Jørgensen [5], but little was done about it. Indeed, from the 1960s onwards,
the semantic approach in terms of possible worlds deepened the gap. The first
serious attempt by a logician to face the problem appears to be due to Stenius
[15], followed by Alchourro´n and Bulygin [2] for unconditional norms, then Al-
chourro´n [1] and Makinson [7] for conditional ones. Input/output logic may be
seen as an attempt to extract the essential mathematical structure behind these
reconstructions of deontic logic.
Like every other approach to deontic logic, input/output logic must face the
problem of accounting adequately for the behaviour of what are called ‘contrary-
to-duty’ norms. The problem may be stated thus: given a set of norms to be
applied, how should we determine which obligations are operative in a situa-
tion that already violates some among them? It appears that input/output logic
provides a convenient platform for dealing with this problem by imposing con-
sistency constraints on the generation of output.
We begin by outlining the central ideas and constructions of unconstrained
input/output logic. These are quite straightforward, and provide the basic frame-
work of the theory. We then sketch a strategy for constraining those operations so
as to deal more sensitively with contrary-to-duty situations. Finally, we explain
how the same operations may be deployed in the analysis of permission.
For further details, the reader is invited to refer to Makinson and van der
Torre [8,9].
2 Unconstrained Input/Output Operations
We avoid assuming that conditional norms bear truth-values. They are not em-
bedded in compound formulae using truth-functional connectives. To avoid all
confusion, they are not even treated as formulae, but simply as ordered pairs
(a, x) of purely boolean (or eventually first-order) formulae.
Technically, a normative code is seen as a set G of conditional norms, i.e.,
a set of such ordered pairs (a, x). For each such pair, the body a is thought of
as an input, representing some condition or situation, and the head x is thought
of as an output, representing what the norm tells us to be desirable, obligatory
or whatever in that situation. The task of logic is seen as a modest one. It is
not to create or determine a distinguished set of norms, but rather to prepare
information before it goes in as input to such a set G, to unpack output as it
emerges and, if needed, coordinate the two in certain ways. A set G of conditional
norms is thus seen as a transformation device, and the task of logic is to act as
its ‘secretarial assistant’.
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The simplest kind of unconstrained input/output operation is depicted in
Figure 1. A set A of propositions serves as explicit input, which is prepared by
being expanded to its classical closure Cn(A). This is then passed into the ‘black
box’ or ‘transformer’ G, which delivers the corresponding immediate output
G(Cn(A)) = {x | for some a ∈ Cn(A), (a, x) ∈ G}.
Finally, this is expanded by classical closure again into the full output out1(G,A) =
Cn(G(Cn(A))). We call this simple-minded output.
Cn(G(Cn(A)))
G(Cn(A))
G
Cn(A)
A
out1(G,A) = Cn(G(Cn(A)))
Fig. 1. Simple-minded Output
This is already an interesting operation. As desired, it does not satisfy the
principle of identity, which in this context we call throughput, i.e., in general we
do not have a ∈ out1(G, {a}) – which we write briefly, dropping the parentheses,
as out1(G, a). It is characterized by three rules. Writing x ∈ out1(G, a) as (a, x) ∈
out1(G) and dropping the right hand side as G is held constant, these rules are:
Strengthening Input (SI): From (a, x) to (b, x) whenever a ∈ Cn(b)
Conjoining Output (AND): From (a, x), (a, y) to (a, x ∧ y)
Weakening Output (WO): From (a, x) to (a, y) whenever y ∈ Cn(x)
But simple-minded output lacks certain features that may be desirable in
some contexts. In the first place, the preparation of inputs is not very sophisti-
cated. Consider two inputs a and b. By classical logic, if x ∈ Cn(a) and x ∈ Cn(b)
then x ∈ Cn(a ∨ b). But there is nothing to tell us that if x ∈ out1(G, a) =
Cn(G(Cn(a))) and x ∈ out1(G, b) = Cn(G(Cn(b))) then x ∈ out1(G, a ∨ b) =
Cn(G(Cn(a ∨ b))).
In the second place, even when we do not want inputs to be automatically
carried through as outputs, we may still want outputs to be reusable as inputs
– which is quite a different matter.
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Operations satisfying each of these two features can be provided with explicit
definitions, pictured by diagrams in the same spirit as that for simple-minded
output, and characterized by straightforward rules. We thus have four very nat-
ural systems of input/output, which are labelled as follows: simple-minded alias
out1 (as above), basic (simple-minded plus input disjunction: out2), reusable
(simple-minded plus reusability: out3), and reusable basic (all together: out4).
For example, reusable basic output may be given a diagram and definition
as in Figure 2. In the definition, a complete set is one that is either maximally
consistent or equal to the set of all formulae.
Cn(G(V2))
G(V2)
out4(G,A)
Cn(G(V1))
G(V1)
G
⊆
⊆
A
V1
V2
out4(G,A) = ∩{Cn(G(V )) | A ⊆ V ⊇ G(V ), V complete}
Fig. 2. Basic Reusable Output
The three stronger systems may also be characterized by adding one or both
of the following rules to those for simple-minded output:
Disjoining input (OR): From (a, x), (b, x) to (a ∨ b, x)
Cumulative transitivity (CT): From (a, x), (a ∧ x, y) to (a, y)
These four operations have four counterparts that also allow throughput. In-
tuitively, this amounts to requiring A ⊆ G(A). In terms of the definitions, it
is to require that G is expanded to contain the diagonal, i.e., all pairs (a, a).
Diagrammatically it is to add arrows from G’s ear to mouth. Derivationally, it
is to allow arbitrary pairs of the form (a, a) to appear as leaves of a derivation;
this is called the zero-premise identity rule ID.
All eight systems are distinct, with one exception: basic throughput, which
we write as out+2 , authorizes reusability, so that out
+
2 = out
+
4 . This may be shown
directly in terms of the definitions, or using the following simple derivation of
CT from the other rules.
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(a, x)
(a ∧ ¬x, x) si
−
(a ∧ ¬x, a ∧ ¬x) id
(a ∧ ¬x, x ∧ (a ∧ ¬x)) and
(a ∧ ¬x, y) wo (a ∧ x, y)
(a, y) OR
The application of WO here is justified by the fact that we have
y ∈ Cn(x ∧ (a ∧ ¬x)) since the right hand formula is a contradiction. Note that
all rules available in basic throughput (including, in particular, identity) are
needed in the derivation, reflecting the fact that CT is not derivable in the
weaker systems.
This strong system indeed collapses into classical consequence, in the sense
that out+4 (G,A) = Cn(m(G) ∪ A) where m(G) is the materialization of G, i.e.,
the set of all formulae a→ x where (a, x) ∈ G.
The authors’ papers [8] and [9, section 1] investigate these systems in detail
– semantically, in terms of their explicit definitions, derivationally, in terms of
the rules determining them, both separately and in relation to each other. We do
not attempt to summarize the results here, but hope that the reader is tempted
to follow further.
3 Why constrain?
As mentioned in section 1, all approaches to deontic logic must face the problem
of dealing with contrary-to-duty norms. In general terms, we recall, the problem
is: given a set of norms, how should we determine which obligations are operative
in a situation that already violates some among them.
The following simple example is adapted from Prakken and Sergot [13].1
Suppose we have the following two norms: The cottage should not have a fence
or a dog; if it has a dog it must have both a fence and a warning sign.
In the usual deontic notation: O(¬(f ∨ d)/t), O(f ∧ w/d), where t stands
for a tautology; in the notation of input/output logic: (t,¬(f ∨ d)), (d, f ∧ w).
Suppose further that we are in the situation that the cottage has a dog, thus
violating the first norm. What are our current obligations?
Unrestricted input/output logic gives f : the cottage has a fence and w: the
cottage has a warning sign. Less convincingly, because unhelpful if the presence
of a dog is regarded as unalterable, it also gives ¬d: the cottage does not have a
1 There are many examples in the literature. Most of them involve ingredients that,
while perfectly natural in ordinary discourse, are extraneous to the essential problem
and thus invite false analyses. These ingredients include defeasibility, causality, the
passage of time, and the use of questionable rules such as CT and OR in deriving
output. We have chosen a very simple example that avoids all those elements. There
is one respect in which it could perhaps be further purified: under input d, the output
is not only inconsistent with the input, but also itself inconsistent. This matter is
discussed at the end of section 5.
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dog. Even less convincingly, it gives ¬f : the cottage does not have a fence, which
is the opposite of what we want.
These results hold even for simple-minded output, without reusability or
disjunction of inputs. The only rules needed are SI and WO, as shown by the
following derivation of ¬f .
(t,¬(f ∨ d))
(t,¬f) wo
(d,¬f) si
A common reaction to examples such as these is to ask: why not just drop
the rule SI of strengthening the input? In semantic terms, why not cut back the
definition of simple-minded output from Cn(G(Cn(A))) to Cn(G(A)), and in
similar (but more complex) fashion with the others? Indeed, this is a possible
option, and the strategy that we will describe below does have the effect of
disallowing certain applications of SI. But simply to drop SI is, in the view of the
authors, too heavy-handed. We need to know why SI is not always appropriate
and, especially, when it remains justified.
4 A Strategy for Constraint: Maxfamilies and their
Outfamilies
Our strategy is to adapt a technique that is well known in the logic of belief
change – cut back the set of norms to just below the threshold of making the
current situation contrary-to-duty. In effect, we carry out a contraction on the
set G of given norms.
Specifically, we look at the maximal subsets G′ ⊆ G such thatout(G′, A) is
consistent with input A. In [8], the family of such G′ is called the maxfamily of
(G,A), and the family of outputs out(G′, A) for G′ in the maxfamily, is called
the outfamily of (G,A).2
To illustrate this, considerG = {(t,¬(f∨d)), (d, f∧w)}, with the contrary-to-
duty input d. Using simple-minded output, maxfamily(G, d) has just one element
{(d, f ∧ w)}, and so outfamily(G, d) has one element, namely Cn(f ∧ w).
2 So defined, the outfamily is not in general the same as the family of all maximal values
of out(G′, A) consistent with A, for G′ ranging over subsets of G. Every maximal
value of out(G′, A) is in the outfamily, but not always conversely. For certain of our
output operations, the two families do coincide, but not for others.
This can be shown by simple examples, such as the Mo¨bius strip of Makin-
son [6,7]. Put G = {(a, x), (x, y), (y,¬a)}. Then, for out = out3 or out = out4,
maxfamily(G, a) has three elements, namely the three two-element subsets of G. As
a result, outfamily(G, a) also has three elements – Cn(∅), Cn(x), and Cn({x, y}). Of
these, only the last is a maximal value of out(G′, A) consistent with A for G′ ranging
over subsets of G.
We add that in this example, not even Cn({x, y}) is a maximal subset of out(G, a)
that is consistent with a, for clearly Cn({x, y}) ⊂ Cn({x, y,¬a ∨ z}) ⊂ out(G, a).
Care is thus needed to avoid confusing maxfamilies with related maximal sets.
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Although the outfamily strategy is designed to deal with contrary-to-duty
norms, its application turns out to be closely related to belief revision and non-
monotonic reasoning when the underlying input/output operation authorizes
throughput.
When all elements of G are of the form (t, x), then for the degenerate in-
put/output operation out+2 (G, a) = out
+
4 (G, a) = Cn(m(G) ∪ {a}), the elements
of outfamily(G, a) are just the maxichoice revisions of m(G) by a, in the sense
of Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [3]. These coincide, in turn, with the
extensions of the default system (m(G), a, ∅) of Poole [12].
More surprisingly, there are close connections with the default logic of Re-
iter, falling a little short of identity. Read elements (a, x) of G as normal de-
fault rules a;x/x in the sense of Reiter [14], and write extfamily(G,A) for
the set of extensions of (G,A). Then, for reusable simple-minded throughput
out+3 , it can be shown that extfamily(G,A) ⊆ outfamily(G,A) and indeed that
extfamily(G,A) consists of precisely the maximal elements (under set inclusion)
of outfamily(G,A).
These results and related ones are proven in Makinson and van der Torre [9].
But in accord with the motivation from the logic of norms, the main focus in
that paper is on input/output logics without throughput. Two kinds of question
are investigated in detail there.
4.1 The search for truth-functional reductions of the consistency
constraint
From the point of view of computation, it is convenient to make consistency
checks as simple as possible, and executable using no more than already existing
programs. For this reason, it is of interest to ask: under what conditions is
the consistency of A with out(G,A) reducible to the consistency of A with the
materialization m(G) of G, i.e., with the set of all formulae a→ x where (a, x) ∈
G?
It is easy to check that the latter consistency implies the former for all seven
of our input/output operations. It turns out that we have equivalence for just
two of them (reusable basic with and without identity).
On the level of derivations, the question can take a rather different form,
with different answers. Given a derivation of (a, x) with leaves L, under what
conditions is the consistency of a with out(L, a) equivalent to its consistency with
m(L)? Curiously, this holds for a wider selection of our input/output operations
– in fact, for all of them except basic output. Even more surprisingly, for some of
the operations (those without OR), the same reduction also holds with respect
to the set h(L) of heads x, and the set f(L) of fulfilments a ∧ x, of elements
(a, x) of L.
From this result on derivations, we can go back and sharpen the semantic
one. When G is a minimal set with x ∈ out(G, a) then, for each of our in-
put/output operations other than basic output, a is consistent with out(G, a)
iff it is consistent with m(G) – and for the operations without OR, with h(G),
f(G).
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4.2 More severe applications of the consistency check
From a practical point of view, whenever we constrain an operation to avoid
excess production, the question arises: how cautious (timid) or brave (foolhardy)
do we want to be? For input/output operations, this issue arises in different
ways on the semantic and derivational levels. On the semantic level, once we
have formed an outfamily we may ask: should we intersect, join, or choose from
its elements to obtain a unique restrained output? On the level of derivations,
it is natural to ask: do we want to apply the consistency check only at the root
of a derivation, or at every step within it?
The policy of checking only at the root corresponds to the option, on the
semantic level, of forming the join of the outfamily; while the stricter policy of
checking at every step is an essentially derivational requirement. But whichever
of the two we choose, it is of interest to know under what conditions they co-
incide. In other words, given a derivation of (a, x) with leaves L such that a is
consistent with out(L, a), under what conditions does it follow that for every
node (b, y) in the derivation, b is consistent with out(L, b)? It turns out that for
certain of the seven input/output operations (again, those without the OR rule)
this result holds. For operations with OR but without the rule CT, a rather
subtler result may be obtained.
One lesson of these rather intricate investigations is that the behaviour of
the consistency constraint depends very much on the choice of input/output
operation; in particular, the presence of the rule OR destroys some properties.
Another lesson is that questions can take different forms, with different answers,
on the semantic and derivational levels. Thirdly, a detour through derivations
can sometimes sharpen semantic results.
5 Doubts and Queries
The investigation of constrained output is a much more complex matter than
that of unconstrained output. It is also more open to doubts and queries. We
put the main ones on the table.
5.1 Dependence on the formulation of G
The outfamily construction, at least in its present form, depends heavily on
the formulation of the generating set G. To illustrate this, we go back to the
cottage example of Prakken and Sergot [13] considered in sections 3 and 4. Here
G = {(t,¬(f ∨ d)), (d, f ∧w)}, and we consider the contrary-to-duty input d. As
we have seen, using simple-minded output, maxfamily(G, d) has unique element
{(d, f ∧ w)} and outfamily(G, d) has unique element Cn(f ∧ w). But if we split
the first element of G into (t,¬f), (t,¬d) then we get a different result. The
maxfamily has two elements {(t,¬f)}, {(d, f ∧ w)} and the outfamily has two
elements Cn(¬f) and Cn(f∧w). Is this dependence on formulation of G a virtue,
or a vice?
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5.2 Are we cutting too deeply?
This problem is related to the first one. In some cases, the outfamily construction
cuts deeply, perhaps too much. Consider again the cottage example, but this time
with just one rule (t,¬(f ∨ d)) in G. Consider the same contrary-to-duty input
d. Then the maxfamily has the empty set as its unique element, and so the
outfamily has Cn(∅) as its unique element. Is this cutting too deeply? Shouldn’t
Cn(¬f) be retained?
5.3 Should we pre-process G?
If we wish to cut less deeply, then a possible procedure might be to ‘pre-process’
G. In the last example, when we decompose the sole element (t,¬(f ∨ d)) of G
into (t,¬f), (t,¬d) then Cn(¬f) becomes the unique element of outfamily in the
contrary-to-duty situation d. In general, for each element (a, x) of G, we could
rewrite the head x in conjunctive normal form x1∧ . . .∧xn, and then split (a, x)
into (a, x1), . . . , (a, xn). This manoeuvre certainly meets the particular example.
But is it appropriate for other examples of the same form with different content?
And does it suffice for more complex examples? It looks suspiciously like hacking.
5.4 Avoid inconsistency with what?
On our definition, maxfamily(G,A) is the family of maximal subsets G′ ⊆ G
such that out(G′, A) is consistent with input A. It may be suggested that this
is too radical – so long as out(G,A) is consistent we should apply it without
constraint.
To illustrate this, take another variation on the cottage example. Put G =
{(t,¬(f ∨ d)), (d,w)}. The second norm no longer requires a fence when there is
a dog, only a warning sign. Consider again the contrary-to-duty input d. Now
out(G, d) = Cn({(¬f,¬d,w}) which is inconsistent with the input d, but itself
perfectly consistent. Should we cut it at all? Perhaps ‘yes’ if the input d is
considered as unalterably true, but ‘no’ if it is presented as true but changeable.
6 Conditional Permission from an Input/output
Perspective
In philosophical discussion of norms it is common to distinguish between two
kinds of permission, negative and positive. Negative permission is easy to de-
scribe: something is permitted by a code iff it is not prohibited by that code, i.e.
iff nihil obstat. In other words, taking prohibition in the usual way, something is
negatively permitted by a code iff there is no obligation to the contrary.
Positive permission is more elusive. As a first approximation, one may say
that something is positively permitted by a code iff the code explicitly presents
it as such. But this leaves the central logical question unanswered. As well as the
items that a code explicitly pronounces to be permitted, there are presumably
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others that in some sense follow from the explicit ones. The problem is to make
it clear what kind of ‘following’ this is.
From the point of view of input/output logic, negative permission is straight-
forward to define: we simply put (a, x) ∈ negperm(G) iff (a,¬x) 6∈ out(G), where
out is any one of the four input/output operations that we have already dis-
cussed.
Because of its negative character, negperm fails the rule SI (strengthening
the input). In other words, we don’t have: (a, x) ∈ negperm(G)&a ∈ Cn(b) ⇒
(b, x) ∈ negperm(G). Indeed, it satisfies the opposite rule WI (weakening the
input): (a, x) ∈ negperm(G)&b ∈ Cn(a)⇒ (b, x) ∈ negperm(G). For if (a,¬x) 6∈
out(G) and b ∈ Cn(a) then by SI for the underlying output operation, (b,¬x) 6∈
out(G) so (b, x) ∈ negperm(G). This is a particular instance of a quite general
pattern: whenever out satisfies a Horn rule (HR) then the corresponding negperm
operation satisfies an ‘inverse’ Horn rule (HR)−1.
How should we define positive permission for conditional norms? Let G,P be
sets of ordered pairs of propositions, where G represents the explicitly given con-
ditional obligations of a code and P its explicitly given conditional permissions.
The operation of forward positive permission is defined by putting:
(a, x) ∈ forperm(P,G) iff (a, x) ∈ out(G ∪ Q) for some singleton or empty
Q ⊆ P
i.e. in the principal case that P is not itself empty,
(a, x) ∈ forperm(P,G) iff (a, x) ∈ out(G(c, z))
for some pair (c, z) ∈ P . This tells us that (a, x) is permitted whenever there is
some explicitly given permission (c, z) such that when we treat it as if it were
an obligation, joining it with G and applying the output operation to the union,
then we get (a, x). Permissions are thus treated like weak obligations, the only
difference being that while the latter may be used jointly, the former may only
be applied one by one.
On the other hand, the operation of backward positive permission is defined
by setting:
(a, x) ∈ backperm(P,G) iff (c,¬z) 6∈ out(G∪{(a, x)}) for some pair (c, z) ∈ P
with c consistent.
This tells us that (a, x) is permitted whenever, given the obligations already
present inG, we can’t forbid x under the condition a without thereby committing
ourselves to forbid something that has been explicitly permitted. With this in
mind, one could also speak of the operation as one of prohibition immunity.
What do these two notions mean in ordinary life? Forward permission answers
to the needs of the citizen, who needs to know whether an action that he is
entertaining is permitted in the current situation. It also corresponds to the
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needs of authorities assessing the action once it is performed. If there is some
explicit permission that ’covers’ the action in question, then it is itself implicitly
permitted.
On the other hand, backward permission fits the needs of the legislator, who
needs to anticipate the effect of adding a prohibition to an existing corpus of
norms. If prohibiting x in condition a would commit us to forbid something
that has been explicitly permitted, then adding the prohibition is inadmissible
under pain of incoherence, and the pair (a, x) is to that extent protected from
prohibition.
Forperm and backperm are very different operations. Whereas forperm sat-
isfies SI, backperm satisfies WI. Like negative permission, backperm satisfies the
’inverse’ rule (HR)−1 of any Horn rule (HR) satisfied by out; but forperm satisfies
instead a ’subverse’ rule (HR)↓.
Backperm may be characterized in a rather different way, using an idea of
Makinson, [7]. Let us say that G is cross-coherent with P iff there is no (c, z) ∈ P
with c consistent, such that (c,¬z) ∈ out(G). Then it is easy to check that
(a, x) ∈ backperm(P,G) iff (a, x) ∈ negperm(H) for every H ⊃ G that is cross-
coherent with P . From this it follows, in particular, that when G is cross-coherent
with P then backperm(P,G) ⊆ negperm(G). In this sense, we can say that under
‘normal conditions’ backward permission is a strengthened negative permission.
Further details of the behaviour of these operations may be found in Makin-
son and van der Torre [10].
7 Conclusions
Drawing together the threads of this paper, we emphasize the main points.
– Input/output logic seeks to extract the essential mathematical structure be-
hind recent attempts to reconstruct deontic logic that avoid treating norms
as if they had truth-values.
– Unconstrained input/output provides us with a simple and elegant construc-
tion with straightforward behaviour, but whose application to norms totally
ignores the subtleties of contrary-to-duty obligations.
– On the other hand, output constrained using the outfamily strategy provides
a way of dealing with contrary-to-duty obligations. Its behaviour is quite
subtle, and depends considerably on the choice of background input/output
operation, in particular on whether or not it authorizes the rule of disjunction
of inputs.
– However, our definition of an outfamily has features that might be regarded
as shortcomings. Its effect depends on the formulation of the generating set
of norms; in some examples it gives what may be regarded as a wrong result
unless some pre-processing as carried out on the generating set; and in some
contexts the requirement of consistency of output with input may be too
strong. These are delicate issues, and it remains possible that they have no
unique solution definable in purely formal terms.
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– Input/output operations also enable us to give a clear formal articulation of
the well-known distinction between negative and positive permission. They
also enable us, for the first time, to distinguish two very different kinds of
positive permission, with quite different uses in practical life.
A topic of further research is the analysis of structured assemblies of in-
put/output operations. Such structures, called logical input/output nets, or li-
ons for short, are graphs, with the nodes labelled by pairs (G, out) where G is a
normative code and out is an input/output operations (or recursively, by other
lions). The relation of the graph indicates which nodes have access to others, pro-
viding passage for the transmission of local outputs as local inputs. The graph
is further equipped with an entry point and an exit point, for global input and
output.
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